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ABSTRACT 
 
Each year, the pharmaceutical industry spends billions of dollars dispatching sales 
representatives to meet with health care providers in order to promote their 
company’s drug products.  To assist these representatives to efficiently and 
effectively deliver their sales messages, pharmaceutical companies rely on data 
concerning individual physician prescribing habits.  However, several states are 
considering, and a few states have enacted, legislation that restricts the ability of 
pharmaceutical companies to utilize such data for commercial purposes.  Such 
legislation is a response to concerns over the rising costs of prescription drugs, the 
close relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the medical profession, 
and concerns over the privacy of patient information.  To proponents of regulation, 
the use of the data allows pharmaceutical companies to manipulate physicians into 
prescribing their products.  To date, such legislation has withstood legal challenges 
from the industry, which claimed that such restrictions violate their First 
Amendment rights to free speech.  However, it is likely only a matter of time before 
the question reaches the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Court’s 
recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC suggests that such restrictions are likely 
to be held unconstitutional.    
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I.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
DETAILING 
 
Pharmaceutical companies spend billions annually on “detailing”: the promotion of 
prescription drugs through one-on-one visits to physicians and other health care 
professional by pharmaceutical representatives.  There are estimated to be more 
than 90,000 pharmaceutical representatives in the United States, with roughly one 
representative for every 6 physicians,1 and an estimated one sales representative 
for every two frequently-prescribing physicians.2  The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates that pharmaceutical companies spent more than $12 billion on detailing 
in the United States in 2008.3  This figure represents an increase from an estimated 
$11 billion spent in 2004 and an estimated $5.5 billion spent in 2000.4  Estimates of 
the amount spent on detailing, however, vary widely.  Because most estimates are 
based on figures self-reported from pharmaceutical companies to health information 
organizations (“HIOs”),5 some estimate that the actual amount spent on detailing 
and other promotional activities could be almost 200% higher.6  The return to 
pharmaceutical companies on their investment in detailing can be significant—an 
                                                 
1 L. Lewis Wall & Dounglas Brown, The high cost of free lunch, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 169 
(2007). 
2 Michael Goldberg, Tiffany Mortellito, & Bob Davenport, PE's annual sales and marketing 
employment survey: The big squeeze, PHARM. EXEC. (Jan. 1, 204) available at  
http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=80921 .  
3 Congressional Budget Office, Promotional Spending for Prescription Drugs, 2 (2009) available at  
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10522/12-02-DrugPromo_Brief.pdf.  
4 Id.  
5 Id. at n.5 (explaining that CBO’s data set was constructed using information from SDI).   
6 Marc-Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical 
Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 1, available at  
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050001#pmed-0050001-b010 
(estimating that the amount spent on detailing in 2004 was actually $20.4 billion, and not IMS’s 
estimate of $7.3 billion.).   3 
 
increase in one prescription per week per prescribing physician can result in 
millions of dollars of additional sales.7 
  At its core, detailing is providing physicians with information about a 
company’s drug products and their approved uses.  The practice, however, has 
evolved into more than simple sales pitches given in doctor’s offices.  The 
pharmaceutical industry utilizes gift-giving to facilitate brand recognition, 
friendship, and access, and has developed sophisticated data-driven physician 
marketing strategies designed to optimize the effectiveness of their sales force.   
1.  The role of friendship and pharmaceutical gifting in detailing. 
 
Sales representatives are selected in part for their interpersonal skills and trained 
to cultivate personal relationships with physicians.  Through the practice of 
“pharmaceutical gifting,” physicians receive free meals, drug samples, pens, coffee 
mugs, magnets, notepads, and several other items from pharmaceutical companies.  
Sales representatives also identify widely-regarded physicians and invite them to 
give paid speeches to other physicians, or offer them positions as paid consultants, 
give them free trips, offer free physician-office management consulting,8 or, in rare 
instances, they have even paid physicians to allow sales representatives to observe 
examinations of patients.9 
                                                 
7 The Prescription Project, Fact Sheet: Prescription Data Mining, available at 
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc_store/publications/prescription_data_mining.pdf.   
8 JEROME P. KASSIRER, M.D., ON THE TAKE: HOW MEDICINE’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN 
ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH (Oxford University Press 2005) at 13. 
9 Id. (citing Peterson, M., Suit says company promoted drug in exam rooms,  N.Y. TIMES (May 15 
2002) at C1).   4 
 
  These practices have become the subject of much attention and controversy.  
In response to criticisms of the interactions between sales representatives and 
physicians, in 2001 the American Medical Association (“AMA”) issued guidelines 
prohibiting physicians from accepting personal gifts of “substantial value” or any 
gifts that do not benefit patients, and meals that are more than “modest.”10  In 
2002, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) 
issued similar guidelines to its members.11  Yet, there is no doubt that many 
physicians still receive substantial items of value from pharmaceutical sales 
representatives.  For example, a recent survey of physicians revealed that 83% 
regularly accept free meals from pharmaceutical sales representatives.12   
  Importantly, the values of these gifts are often substantial.  According to 
documents recently submitted to Congress as required by the 2010 health care 
reform bill,13 in 2007 Pfizer sales representatives gave out 101 million prescription 
drug samples worth $2.7 billion, Merck & Co. representatives handed out 39 million 
samples worth $356 million, and Eli Lilly & Co. distributed 33 million samples 
worth $67 million.14    
                                                 
10 American Medical Association, Opinion 8.061: Gifts to physicians from industry (2001) available at   
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion8061.shtml.  
11 PhRMA, Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (2002), available at  
http://www.phrma.org/code_on_interactions_with_healthcare_professionals.   
12 Eric G. Campbell, Russell L. Gruen, James Mountford, Lawrence Miller, Paul D. Cleary, & David 
Blumenthal, A national survey of physician-industry relationships, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1742 (2007).   
13 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).   
14 Jared A. Favole, Drug Makers Provide View of Sampling Practices, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2010) 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704764404575286423798063474.html.  5 
 
  Due to increased demands on physician’s time, and criticism of 
pharmaceutical gifting, detailing has become a less effective marketing strategy. 15  
Widespread criticism of the close relationships between physicians and sales 
representatives combined with an oversaturation of sales representatives has 
produced physicians who are less willing to meet with sales representatives.  
According to a recent survey, 23% of physicians now refuse to meet with 
pharmaceutical sales representatives and an increasing percentage of physicians—
49.6%—prefer or require sales representatives to make appointments to see them.16  
Another survey indicates that from 2009 to 2010, the number of physicians who 
refused to meet with pharmaceutical representatives increased by 50%.17   
2.  The increasing importance of data in detailing. 
 
The decline in physician willingness to meet with sales representatives has greatly 
increased the importance of data utilizing in the detailing process.18  Sales 
representatives no longer have the luxury of spending several minutes with each of 
their assigned physicians each week, which allowed for representatives to adjust 
their message and approach mid-conversation.19   Instead, sales representatives 
                                                 
15 Pankaj Kumar & Ron Brand, Detailing Gets Personal, PHARM. EXEC. (Apr. 1, 2003) available at 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=64071 (noting that a focus 
on large volumes of sales representatives and a high numbers of physician visits has led many 
physicians to become less receptive to sales representatives). 
16 SK&A, Physician Access, (2010), available at 
http://www.skainfo.com/health_care_market_reports/physician_access_pharma.pdf.   
17 Thomas Sullivan, Pharmaceutical Reps Seen by Fewer Physicians, POLICY & MED. (May 10, 2010) 
available at http://www.policymed.com/2010/05/pharmaceutical-reps-seen-by-fewer-physicians.html.   
18 A. Fugh-Berman, S. Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence 
Doctors, 4 PLOS MED 150 (2007), available at  
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0040150#pmed-
0040150-b026. 
19 Chris Nickum & Tim Kelly, Missing the Mark(et), Pharm. Exec. (Sept. 1, 2005) available at  
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=177968.   6 
 
must be more selective in scheduling visits and be prepared to deliver a customized 
and successful message in a matter of a few minutes.  To aid their sales forces in 
selecting which physicians to visit and what messages to deliver, pharmaceutical 
companies have sought the assistance of HIOs such as IMS Health Inc., SDI Health 
LLC (formerly Verispan), Wolters Kluwer Pharma Solutions Inc., and Source 
Healthcare Analytics Inc., which focus on gathering data about physicians and their 
prescribing trends. 20  Tracking the prescribing practices of individual physicians 
allows pharmaceutical companies to monitor the performance of their drug 
representatives and provide them with customized messages designed to convince 
the physicians they meet with to prescribe their drug products.  The methods HIOs 
employ to gather prescription data, however, are part of the controversy.    
  During the course of filling prescriptions, pharmacies gather what is known 
as “prescriber-identifiable data” (“PI data”).  PI data includes the date a 
prescription was filled, the name of the patient receiving the prescription, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) license number of the prescribing physician or similar 
physician identifier, and the name, dosage, and quantity of the prescribed drug 
product.  PI data is sold to HIOs, who install software on pharmacy computers to 
convert those portions of the PI data that identify patients into “de-identified” codes 
before the data is transmitted from the pharmacy in order to comply with the 
                                                 
20 For example, IMS Healthcare’s 2009 Annual Report states that sales to pharmaceutical companies 
accounted for 85% of their revenue in 2009 and boasts that “[a]ll major pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies are our customers.”  See IMS Healthcare Inc., 2009 Annual Report, 
available at 
http://www.imshealth.com/imshealth/Global/Content/Document/Annual%20Reports/IMSHEALT
HINC10K.pdf.     7 
 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), which only 
permits the release of the “de-identified” PI data.21   
  Having been scrubbed of patient-identifying data and transmitted to the 
HIO, the PI data is then matched with “prescriber-reference data,” (“PR data”) 
purchased from the American Medical Association (“AMA”), whose Physician 
Masterfile includes DEA license numbers matched to the physician’s name, address, 
education credentials, and specialties.22  Matching the PI data from pharmacies 
with the PR data in the Physician Masterfile allows HIOs to produce almost 
instantaneous and detailed reports and analysis of the prescribing trends of 
individual physicians.  Additionally, many HIOs combine the PI and PR data with 
demographic and psychographic information (personality characteristics) to further 
predict the types of sales approaches suitable to particular physicians in a process 
called integrated segmentation.   
  This data is then sold to pharmaceutical companies, which use it to 
categorize physicians, to create customized sales messages for each category of 
physicians, and to track the performance of their sales representatives and 
effectiveness of their messaging.  For example, physicians who prescribe the 
company’s drug products frequently are often categorized as “high prescribers” or 
“loyal prescribers,” and physicians who prescribe newly-released medications are 
identified as “early adopters.”   Physicians who appear to only prescribe the 
                                                 
21 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(1) (2006). 
22 The AMA’s Physician Masterfile contains data on more than one million physicians and residents, 
82,000 medical students, and 353,737 graduates of foreign medical schools who reside in the United 
States. 8 
 
company’s products for patients matching a certain limited profile are identified as 
“niche subscribers.”  The data can also warn sales representatives that certain 
physicians are unfriendly to in-person sales calls, allowing the sales representative 
to design an alternative approach.  As a Merck & Co. sales representative training 
guide explains, the data “pinpoints a prescriber’s current habits” and helps the 
pharmaceutical company “identify which products are currently in favor with the 
physician in order to develop a strategy to change those prescriptions into Merck 
prescriptions.”23 
 
II.  THE CONTROVERSY  
 
Criticism of the marketing tactics of pharmaceutical companies dates to the 1950s, 
when Senator Estes Kefauver, then Chairman of the United States Senate’s 
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, argued that pharmaceutical companies’ 
promotional expenses were increasing drug costs.24  Today, the debate over 
pharmaceutical company use of prescription data lays at the intersection of three 
broader and active national policy debates over (i) the cost of health care, including 
prescription drugs, (ii) the propriety of pharmaceutical company interaction with 
the medical profession, and (iii) patient privacy.25    This section briefly offers an 
explanation and critique of each of these arguments.   
                                                 
23 Merck & Co., Basic training participant guide, (2002) available at 
http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/xib00a10.   
24 ESTES KEFAUVER, IN A FEW HANDS (Hamondsworth: Penguin 1965).  
25 Pew Prescription Project, supra note 7 (arguing that the use of PI data, (i) is “a key factor in the 
skyrocketing costs of prescription drugs and the increased usage of expensive brand-name 
medicines,” (ii) “encourages the prescription of new drugs that might be riskier to patients than 
already established treatments,” and (iii) “take[s] place without the consent, and generally without 
the knowledge, of physicians.”).   9 
 
1.  Claim one: The use of PI data contributes to the high cost of prescription drugs.  
 
It is estimated that in 2009 more than $297.5 billion was spent on prescription 
drugs in the United States.26  According to the United States Government 
Accountability Office, prescription drug products accounted for an estimated 10.7% 
of health-care expenditures in the U.S. from 2000 to 2004.27  Although this is a 
modest portion of all health-care expenditures, large percentage increases in the 
total expenditures on prescription drugs during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
large profit margins for drug companies caused alarm.28  For example, from 2000 to 
2001, total expenditures on prescription drugs grew by 18.1%.29  This trend has 
moderated considerably, however, with total expenditures on prescription drugs 
increasing by merely 1.8% from 2007 to 2008, and by 4.5% from 2008 to 2009.  In 
2010, drug expenditures are expected to rise by a similar percentage from 2009 to 
2010.30 
  The opponents of pharmaceutical company use of PI data argue that the data, 
and pharmaceutical detailing in general, increase prescription drug expenditures by 
enabling sales representatives to target physicians who commonly prescribe less 
costly generic drug products and convince them to prescribe more costly brand-
                                                 
26 James M. Hoffman, Fred Doloresco, Lee C. Vermeulen, Nilay D. Shah, Linda Matusiak, Robert  J. 
Hunkler, & Glen T. Schumock, Projecting future drug expenditures, 67 AMER. J. HEALTH-SYSTEM 
PHARM. 919, 921 (2010).    
27 United States Government Accountability Office, Prescription drugs: Price trends for frequently 
used brand and generic drugs from 2000 through 2004 (2006). 
28 Kaiser Family Foundation, Prescription Drug Costs: Background Brief, available at  
http://www.kaiseredu.org/topics_im.asp?id=352&parentID=68&imID=1#_edn5b.   
29 Hoffman, supra note 27 at 921.    
30 Id.  10 
 
name drugs31 that are, according to critics, equally or less effective than the generic 
drugs.32  As the Attorney General of New Hampshire argued before the United 
States District Court for the District of New Hamphsire, “[w]here equally effective 
and less costly generic medication is available,” the PI data is used “to pressure 
physicians to change their prescriptions . . . and unnecessarily raise[] health care 
costs.”33   
  HIOs and pharmaceutical companies respond to these criticisms by pointing 
to recent evidence suggesting that the era of rapid growth of prescription drug 
expenditures has passed as the “[i]ncreased availability and use of generic 
equivalents . . . continue[s] to moderate drug expenditure growth.” 34  Additionally, 
proponents of PI data argue that it helps reduce, rather than increase prescription 
drug costs.  First, the use of PI data reduces marketing costs as it allows 
pharmaceutical companies to spend less, not more, on marketing efforts and 
sampling because they are able to better focus their marketing efforts.35  Secondly, 
studies suggest that promotional activities have played a critical role in decreasing 
the underuse of medications, leading to more effective treatment of illness and a 
                                                 
31 Id. See also Pew Prescription Project, supra note 7, and National Physicians Alliance, Issue Brief: 
The Sale of Physician Prescribing Data Raises Health Care Costs-The National Physicians Alliance 
Calls For a Ban, available at 
http://thehill.com/images/stories/whitepapers/pdf/IB_SalePhysData_Hirez.pdf.  
32 Pew Prescription Project, supra note 7.   
33 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, IMS v. Ayotte, 2006 WL 4507569 (Sept. 1, 2006). 
34 Hoffman, supra note 27 at 926. 
35 Robert A. Musacchio & Robert J. Hunckler, More Than a Game of Keep Away, PHARM. EXEC. (May 
1, 2006) available at  
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=323311&pageID=4.   11 
 
reduction in overall health-care costs.36  Thirdly, PI data allows pharmaceutical 
companies to rapidly identify and educate physicians who may not be aware that 
more safe and effective treatments have become available.37  Indeed, the health care 
profession is plagued with what is referred to as “clinical inertia,” the failure of 
physicians to initiate needed therapies in a timely fashion.38  Finally, without the 
highly-targeted, and thus rapid and cost-effective marketing efforts that PI data 
enables, some argue that the rate of adoption of newly-approved drugs would likely 
decrease—resulting in an increase in the costs of the drugs in order to recoup drug 
development costs over a shorter period of time.39 
2. Claim two: Close pharmaceutical company interaction with the medical profession 
presents a conflict of interest that corrupts prescribing practices. 
 
The criticisms of the use of PI data fit within the broader debate over the close 
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians.40  Indeed, many 
are calling for far-reaching reforms to prevent conflicts of interests in the medical 
profession.41  Often, the arguments against the use of PI data are not focused on PI 
                                                 
36 Julie M. Donohue, Marisa Cevasco, & Meredith B. Rosenthal, A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 673 (2007).  
37 Declaration of Thomas P. Wharton Jr., M.D., F.A.C.C in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, IMS v. Ayotte, No. 06-CV-280-PB (July 20, 2006).  
38 Lawrence S. Phillips, William T. Branch, Curtiss B. Cook, Joyce P. Doyle, Imad M. El-Kebbi, 
Danial L. Gallina, Christopher D. Miller, David C. Zeimer, & Catherine S. Barnes, Clinical Inertia, 
135 ANN. INTERN. MED. 825 (2001).    
39 Second Declaration of Peter Barton Hutt, IMS v. Sorrell, Nos. 1:07-cv-188, 1:07-cv-220. 
(May 29, 2008).  
40 See Thomas B. Stossel, Regulating Academic-Industrial Research Relationships: Solving Problems 
of Stifling Progress?, 353 N. ENGL. J. MED. 10 (2005) (arguing that “almost no publications” on the 
topic of physician conflicts of interest were published prior to 1987).   
41 See e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, David J. Rothman, Linda Blank, David Blumenthal, Susan C. 
Chimonas, Janlori J. Cohen, Janlori Goldman, Jerome P. Kassirer, Harry Kimball, James Naughton,  
Neil Smelser, Health industry practices that create conflict of interest.  A policy proposal for academic 
medical centers, 295 JAMA 429 (2006).   12 
 
data, but rather on the practice of detailing more generally.42  The use of PI data is 
not necessarily portrayed as a distinct harm, but merely a powerful tool in 
detailing.   
  Underlying the argument that the use of PI data unnecessarily results in 
increased drug expenditures is the presumption that such increased expenditures 
are not beneficial to public health.43  Rather than representing justified additional 
expenditures, the prescription of more costly brand-name products is the result of a 
distortion or corruption of the physician’s decision-making process.  Indeed, to some, 
pharmaceutical gifting, sponsorship of Continuing Medical Education (“CME”), 
research grants, donations to medical schools, and complicity with professional 
organizations create conflicts of interest that at best undermine patient confidence 
in their physicians, and, at worst, present a serious public health problem.44  Some 
evidence suggests that the public agrees, as surveys reveal that 74%-84% of 
patients are concerned over the effects of pharmaceutical gifting on their care.45 
  To many, sales representatives are highly-trained educators who provide 
critical information to physicians on their company’s products in a convenient and 
efficient manner.46  Indeed, given the increasing constraints on physician time, 
detailers provide an important service to physicians by digesting and delivering up-
                                                 
42 See e.g., Pew Prescription Project, supra note 7. 
43 Supra n. 33.  
44 See e.g., Kassirer, supra n. 8.  See also Pew Prescription Project, supra note 7 (claiming that 
“[m]arketing based on prescriber data often involves biased or inaccurate information about health 
risks, and encourages the prescription of new drugs that might be riskier to patients than already 
established treatments.”).  
45 Ruben V. Gibbons, Frank J. Landry, Denise L. Blouch, David L. Hones, Frederick K. Williams, 
Catherine R. Lucey, & Kurt Kroenke, A comparison of physicians’ and patients’ attitudes toward 
pharmaceutical industry gifts, 13 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 151 (1998).     
46 Richard Levy, The role and value of pharmaceutical marketing, 3 ARCH FAM MED 327 (1994).   13 
 
to-date scientific research that has implications on the physician’s everyday 
practice.  For example, one study found that 75% of the physicians surveyed 
considered the information provided by sales representatives to be “very useful” 
(15%) or “somewhat useful” (59%).47   
  Critics, however, portray sales representatives as young, attractive, “reps in 
cars” handing out free meals and samples and employing messaging tactics 
deliberately designed to “manipulate” physicians into prescribing their products.48  
These criticisms are fueled by rare, yet disturbing, evidence that some sales 
representatives view their interactions with physicians as a quid-pro-quo 
relationship, or believe they have the ability to manipulate physicians into 
prescribing their products.49  Many argue that even in the absence of quid-pro-quo 
relationships, pharmaceutical gifting leads physicians to subconsciously increase 
the number of prescriptions they write for the giver’s drug product.50  Critics 
counter the “educational” function of sales representatives by pointing out that the 
                                                 
47 Kaiser Family Foundation, National survey of physicians, (2006) available at 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057-05.pdf . 
48 A. Fugh-Berman, S. Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence 
Doctors, 4 PLOS MED 150 (2007), available at  
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0040150#pmed-
0040150-b026.  
49 See e.g., Gariner Harris & Robert Pear, Drug Maker’s Efforts to Compete in Lucratice Insulin 
Market Are Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Times (Jan. 28, 2006) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/28/national/28insulin.html?pagewanted=print (quoting an e-mail 
from a district manager of Novo Nordisk stating that “[o]ur goal is 50 or more scripts per week for 
each territory ... If you are not achieving this goal, ask yourself if those doctors that you have such 
great relationships with are being fair to you. Hold them accountable for all of the time, samples, 
lunches, dinners, programs and past preceptorships that you have provided or paid for and get the 
business!! You can do it!”).   
50 Fugh-Berman, supra note 49.    14 
 
accuracy of the information they provide is questionable.51  As a former editor of the 
New England Journal of Medicine stated, “[t]o rely on drug companies for unbiased 
evaluations of their products makes about as much sense as relying on beer 
companies to teach us about alcoholism.” 52 
  Despite the frequency with which criticisms of detailing are asserted, the 
exact effect of detailing on the prescribing practices of physicians is the subject of 
much debate and dramatically varying results.  For example, one study found that 
detailing resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of prescriptions for 
particular antidepressants—from 10% to 89% of all medications prescribed for 
newly-admitted patients—during the period of time in which the sales 
representative was making frequent visits.53  Another study demonstrated that 
physicians who accept travel to pharmaceutical company sponsored symposia at 
resort locations were two to three times more likely to prescribe the company’s 
drugs after they returned.54  Additionally, social science studies focus on the effects 
of giving gifts of even marginal monetary value, arguing that they can create a 
subconscious willingness of the receiver to reciprocate.55  Interestingly, 84% of 
                                                 
51 Michael G. Ziegler, Pauline Lew, & Brian C. Singer, The accuracy of drug information from 
pharmaceutical sales representatives, 273 JAMA 1296 (1995).   
52 Marcia Angell, The pharmaceutical industry—to whom is it accountable?, 342 N ENGL. J. MED. 
1902 (2000).  
53 Thomas L. Schwartz, Daniel J. Kuhles, Michael Wade, & Prakash S. Masand, Newly admitted 
psychiatric patient prescriptions and pharmaceutical sales visits, 13 ANN CLIN. PSYCH’Y 159 (2001).    
54 Kassirer, supra n. 8 (citing James P. Orlowski & Leon Wateska, The effects of pharmaceutical firm 
enticements on physician prescribing patters: There’s no such thing as a free lunch, 103 CHEST 270 
(1992)).   
55 Dana Katz, Arthur L. Caplan, & Jon F. Merz, All gifts are large and small: toward an 
understanding of the ethics of pharmaceutical industry gift-giving, 3 AM. J. BIOETH. 39 (2003).  See 
also Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just a gift?, 283 
JAMA 373 (2000); and Brooks King-Casas, Damon Tomlin, Cedric Anen, Colin F. Camerer, Steven R.  15 
 
medical students believe that detailing influences other physicians’ prescribing 
behavior, yet only 39% believed that it had the potential to influence their own 
prescribing determinations.56  Even some practicing physicians admit that free 
meals and gifts do influence their prescribing habits in marginal situations where 
the doctor believes that competing drugs are equivalent.57   
  Nevertheless, the exact effect of pharmaceutical detailing on prescribing 
habits remains difficult to quantify.58  Some have concluded that physicians are not 
easily persuaded by sales representatives.59  Importantly, even many of the studies 
that do suggest detailing increases prescriptions nevertheless agree that whether or 
not these prescriptions are beneficial to patient health is an open question.60   
3.  Claim three: The use of PI data is a threat to patient and physician privacy.  
 
Opponents of the use of PI data claim that the data is sold without the consent and 
knowledge of physicians,61 and that its use in detailing amounts to an intrusion into 
                                                                                                                                                            
Quartz, & P. Read Montague, Getting to know you: Reputation and trust in a two-person economic 
exchange, 308 SCIENCE 78 (2005).  
56 Michael A. Steinman, Michael G. Shilpak, & Stephen J. McPhee, Of principles and pens: Attitudes 
and practices of medicine housestaff toward pharmaceutical industry promotions, 110 AMER. J. MED. 
551 (2001).   
57 Kassirer, supra n. 8 at 11 (citing Adams, C. Doctors ‘Dine ‘n’ Dash in style, as drug firms pick up 
the tab, Wall St. J. (May 14, 2001 at 1).   
58 Congressional Budget Office, supra n. 3 (noting that “some analyses have found positive effects on 
the number of prescriptions written for the targeted drug, but others suggest that detailing’s effects 
are unclear.”).  See also Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The effects and role of direct-to-
physician marketing in the pharmaceutical industry: an integrative review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLICY 
LAW AND ETHICS 785, 795 (2005) (noting that while the effect of detailing on prescribing behavior is 
statistically significant, yet there is little consensus about the size of the effect).   
59 Srindhar Narayanan, Puneet Manchada, & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Temporal Differences in the 
Role of Marketing Communication in New Product Categories, J. MARKET. RES. 278 (August 2005). 
60 See Wazana, supra note 56 at 378 (noting that some studies found that detailing resulted in 
“improved ability to identify the treatment for complicated illnesses,” yet cautioning that “[n]o study 
used patient outcome measures.”).   
61 Pew Prescription Project, supra note 7.  16 
 
the physician-patient relationship.62  Many patients and physicians share these 
concerns.  For example, in 2009, the Vermont Medical Society unanimously passed 
a resolution stating that the use of PI data “is an intrusion into the way physicians 
practice medicine”63 and more than 70% of Americans express concerns over the 
privacy of their medical information.64  While PI data, as explained above, is “de-
identified” prior to being transmitted to HIOs, opponents also argue that de-
identified PI data can often be “re-identified” by matching the de-identified data 
with other commercial or publicly-available databases,65 raising the specter of 
discrimination based on medical condition.66  In fact, a pharmaceutical industry 
publication asserts that ““the growth and networking of computerized databases 
has made it possible to identify the ‘de-identified’ people with surprising accuracy. 
Thus, your anonymity isn't guaranteed even if a database doesn't contain 
information that easily identifies you.”67 
                                                 
62 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, IMS v. Ayotte, No. 06-CV-280-PB (Sept. 1, 2006) (claiming that the use of prescriber-
identifiable prescription data by pharmaceutical companies to pressure physicians to change their 
prescriptions intrudes on the prescribing practices of New Hampshire's physicians and unnecessarily 
raises health care costs.).   
63 Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) In Support of Appellee and 
Urging Affirmance, IMS v. Sorrell, No. 09-1913-cv (L) (citing Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 1998(20) 
(2009)).   
64 Harris Interactive, The Benefits of Electronic Medical Records Sound Good, but Privacy Could 
Become a Difficult Issue, (Feb. 8, 2007) available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NEWS/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=1174.  
65 Supra n. 63 at 9 (citing Khaled El Emam, Sam Jabbouri, Scott Sams, Youenn Drouet, & Michael 
Power, Evaluating Common De-identification Heuristics for Personal Health Information, 8 J. MED. 
INTERNET RES. 4 (2006)) 
66 Catherine A. Martin & Tamara R. Tenney, Preparing for quality-based payments: trends and legal 
barriers to successful implementation, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCIENCES LAW 1 (2009).   
67 Jennifer L. Klocke, Prescription records for sale: privacy and free speech issues arising from the 
sale of de-identified medical data, 44 Id. L. Rev. 511 (2008) (citing Herb Edelstein & Janet Millenson, 
Data Mining in Depth: Data Mining and Privacy, 65 DM REV. (Dec. 2003), available at http:// 
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  Proponents of the use of PI data counter these privacy concerns by pointing to 
the benefits that the use of PI data enables, as increased transparency results in 
better health outcomes and improved patient safety.68  For example, the gathering 
of PI data for commercial purposes enables a host of non-commercial uses for 
government and academia.  Additionally, the PI data allows pharmaceutical 
companies to quickly identify physicians who need to be contacted in the event of a 
newly-discovered side effect or recall.  The AMA has urged HIOs to use PI data to 
provide health care providers with important information about their own practices, 
including comparisons of physician prescribing patterns among peers, patient 
compliance with treatment, and to assist in the development of patient-outcome-
based compensation schemes, disease management programs, and public health 
monitoring.69  In short, the profit made from the sale of PI data to pharmaceutical 
companies enables many other beneficial applications.  As one industry publication 
claimed “[t]he industry underwrites the substantial costs that HIOs incur when 
collecting and processing the information. Without this support, the data would not 
exist.”70   
 
III.  THE REGULATORY RESPONSE 
 
Four states—New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont—have enacted 
laws banning the sale, use, or license of PI data for commercial purposes or 
                                                 
68 Kevin O’Reilly, Prescription Data Opt-Out Law Upheld in Maine, Nat. Legislative Action on 
Prescription Drug Prices, available at http://www.reducedrugprices.org/read.asp?news=5918.   
69 American Medical Association, Reports of Board of Trustees, (December 2004) available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/meetings/public/interim04/bot_reports.pdf  
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conditioning the use of such data on compliance with certain regulations.  Several 
additional states have considered, or are considering, similar legislation.71  On the 
federal level, in 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives rejected an outright ban on 
data-mining, but opted to study the issue, and the U.S. Senate rejected an 
amendment offered by Senators Herb Kohl (D-WI) and Dick Durbin (D-IL) that 
would have banned the commercial use of PI data.72   
 
  In June 2006, New Hampshire became the first state in the nation to prohibit 
the use of PI data for marketing purposes.  The Prescription Information 
Confidentiality Act (“PICA”),73 provides for both criminal and civil penalties for 
pharmacies, insurance companies, and similar entities who license, transfer, or sell 
PI data “for any commercial purpose.”74  Vermont and Maine followed closely 
behind New Hampshire, enacting similar legislation in 2007.  Vermont passed the 
Prescription Confidentiality Law, which bans the use of a physician’s PI data for 
commercial purposes unless the physician opts-in to allowing pharmaceutical 
companies to access his or her data.  The Vermont legislation also requires 
                                                 
71 These include Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1973 (2009), District of Columbia (D.C. Code § 3-
1207.41 (2008) (http://www.asi-solutions.com/files/DC_SafeRx_Bill.pdf ), Illinois (H.B 1459, 95th 
Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2007)), Kansas (S.B. 229 (Kan. 2007)), Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1711-E 
(2005)), Maryland (S.B. 266 (Md. 2007)), Massachusetts (S.B. 1275 (Mass. 2007)), Nevada, (S.B. 231 
(Nev. 2007)), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 318:47-f, 318-47g, 318-B:12 (2006)), New 
York, (H.B. 5891B, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009)), North Carolina (S.B. 159, Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2007)), 
Rhode Island (S.B. 2683, Gen. Assem. (R.I. 2008)), Texas (S.B. 1620 (Tex. 2007)), Vermont (Vt. Stat. 
Ann. Tit. 18, § 4631 (2009), Washington (H.B. 1850 (Wash. 2008)), and West Virginia (W. Va. Code. § 
30-5-12c (2008)). 
72 Ed Silverman, Senate Amendment Would Block Data Mining, PHARMALOT (Dec. 10, 2009) 
available at http://www.pharmalot.com/2009/12/senate-amendment-would-block-data-mining/.  
73 2006 N.H. Laws § 328, codified at N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 318:47-f, 318:47-g, 318-B:12 (IV) (2006).   
74 The statute defines “commercial purpose” as including, but not limited to, “advertising, marketing, 
promotion, or any activity that could be used to influence sales or market share of a pharmaceutical 
product, influence or elevate the prescribing behavior of an individual health care professional, or 
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physicians to disclose to patients the range of possible drug treatments, as well as 
the costs, benefits and risks of each treatment, and creates a consumer fraud cause 
of action for violations of the statute.75  Maine similarly enacted legislation 
prohibiting the use of PI data “for any marketing purpose,” but it requires Maine 
physicians to opt-out of allowing pharmaceutical companies to access their data.76  
Finally and most recently, on July 1, 2009, Massachusetts promulgated regulations 
requiring manufacturers to (i) offer physicians the ability to opt-out of allowing their 
PI data to be used for marketing purposes, (ii) respect the confidentiality of the data 
by training employees on data handling and establishing disciplinary actions for 
data misuse, and (iii) designate an “internal contact person to handle inquiries 
regarding the use of the data.”77 
  The AMA has also responded to the criticisms of the use of PI data in 
detailing.  In 2001, the AMA issued guidelines for the use of PI data by 
pharmaceutical companies.78  However, the guidelines were unsuccessful in 
assuaging physician concerns and growing scrutiny by state legislatures,79 and on 
July 1, 2006, the AMA created the Prescribing Data Restriction Program (“PDRP”), 
which provides physicians with the ability to restrict their PR data from being used 
by pharmaceutical company employees who have direct contact with physicians.80  
                                                 
75 VT. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 4631, 4622; tit. 33 § 2004; tit. 9 § 2466a (2007).   
76 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (2007).   
77 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 970.005(2) (2009).   
78 American Medical Association, Best Practice Guidelines for Use of Prescribing Data by Industry, 
(2001).   
79 Musacchio, supra n. 35.   
80 While the PDRP restricts pharmaceutical sales representatives from accessing PR data on a 
physician enrolled in the PDRP, the pharmaceutical company’s headquarters may still use such 
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The PDRP is designed to serve as an alternative to more restrictive state 
legislation,81 which if adopted more broadly, could threaten the reported $47.5 
million in annual revenue the AMA generates from licensing the Physician 
Masterfile and similar databases.82  While the PDRP has not prevented all state 
legislation, more than 26,000 physicians have enrolled in the program, and a survey 
of physicians revealed that 96% of physicians were either “very satisfied” or 
“satisfied” with the PDRP.83  Referencing the PDRP has also been a powerful tactic 
in lobbying against state legislation restricting the use of PI data.84 
 
IV.  LEGAL CHALLENGES 
 
The New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont statutes were immediately challenged as 
violations of HIO companies’ First Amendment rights.  In July 2006, IMS Health 
Inc. and Verispan, LLC filed a complaint with the United States District Court for 
the District of New Hampshire seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the 
statute.  On April 30, 2007, the New Hampshire District Court ruled in their favor, 
finding that the statute restricted “commercial speech” protected by the First 
Amendment, and was thus subject to intermediate scrutiny under the test 
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Under Central Hudson, 
“commercial speech” that concerns lawful activity and is truthful and not 
                                                 
81 Musacchio, supra n. 35.   
82 American Medical Association, Annual Report 2009, (2009) available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/37/2009-annual-report.pdf.  
83 O’Rielly, supra n. 68.   
84 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp 2d 163, 173 (D.N.H. 2007) (noting that IMS Health and 
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misleading may only be restricted if, (i) if there is a substantial government interest 
in prohibiting the speech, (ii) if the restriction “directly advances” the substantial 
government interest, and (iii) if the restriction is no more extensive than 
necessary.85   
  The New Hampshire Attorney General argued that the state had two 
interests in restricting the commercial use of PI data: (1) “limiting unwarranted 
intrusions into the decision-making process of prescribing physicians,”86 and (2) 
“prevent[ing] pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifiable data in 
ways that undermine public health and increase health care costs.”87  According to 
the District Court, the New Hampshire statute failed to promote either of these 
interests because the law did not involve “solicitations that invade the tranquility of 
the home or that target vulnerable victims,” and the state “failed to prove that any 
reductions in health care costs that may result [from the ban on commercial use of 
PI data] can be achieved without compromising patient care.”88  The district court 
also found the law to be broader than necessary, as it prohibited potentially 
beneficial targeting efforts that the use of PI data enables, and unnecessary, as the 
state could instead ban industry gifts to physicians, further educate physicians 
about generic drug products, or utilize the state’s Medicaid Pharmacy Program to 
                                                 
85 446 U.S. at 566. 
86 IMS v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 179. 
87 Id. at 180. 
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require prior authorization before a physician could prescribe a name-brand drug 
whose cost-effectiveness was questionable.89 
  In November 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed the District Court, finding that the New Hampshire law “principally 
regulate[d] conduct, and to the extent that the challenged portions impinge[d] at all 
upon speech, that speech is of scant societal value.”90  In the alternative, the First 
Circuit held that even if PI data were considered to be commercial speech, the 
requirements of the Central Hudson test had been met.  The Circuit noted that 
while “the state ‘must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that the 
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree,” certitude was not 
required.91  The Circuit accepted the New Hampshire legislature’s claims about the 
effects of sales representative use of PI data on physician prescribing habits, 
describing PI data as “a tool for tipping the balance of bargaining power in their 
[sales representatives’] favor” and accepting the legislature’s determination that it 
increased health care costs and “compromised the integrity of physician decision-
making.”92  IMS Health Care Inc. and Verispan petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari, but on June 29, 2009, the Supreme Court denied their request.   
  The First Circuit’s decision in IMS v. Ayotte is a landmark ruling in the field 
of data-mining.  In August 2010, the First Circuit, in IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 2010 
                                                 
89 Id. at 182 (citing 2004 N.H. Laws, ch. 188).   
90 IMS v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009) (further 
explaining that “[t]he plaintiffs, who are in the business of harvesting, refining, and selling this 
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jerky, any regulation constitutes a restriction of speech. We think that such an interpretation 
stretches the fabric of the First Amendment beyond any rational measure.”).   
91 Id. at 55.   
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WL 3025496 (1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2010) reiterated its holding in Ayotte by overruling a 
decision of the United States District Court for the district of Maine which held that 
Maine’s restrictions on the use of PI data were unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.93  Soon after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ayotte, the 
Vermont federal district court upheld Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law in 
IMS v. Sorrell, agreeing with the First Circuit that the law satisfied the Central 
Hudson intermediate-scrutiny test.94  This case is currently on appeal to the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and as of August 31, 2010, a decision is expected to be 
announced any day.   
 
V.  THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED v. FEC 
 
The Supreme Court likely denied certiorari in IMS v. Ayotte because the decision 
represented the first circuit court ruling on the constitutionality of restrictions on 
commercial use of PI data.  Indeed, at the time the petition for writ of certiorari 
from the First Circuit was submitted, no other circuit court had weighed in on the 
issue.  The challenge to Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law, however, 
which is currently pending before the Second Circuit, may present just such a 
case.95  If the Second Circuit strikes down the Vermont Prescription Confidentiality 
Law, a circuit split will result, rendering a grant of certiorari from the Supreme 
Court much more likely.  Even if the Second Circuit upholds the Vermont law, the 
number of states considering similar legislation, and the commitment of HIOs to 
                                                 
93 IMS Health Inc. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Me. 2008).   
94 IMS v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 429 (D.Vt. 2009).   
95 While the Second Circuit heard oral arguments in IMS v. Sorrell in October 2009, as of the writing 
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challenging such laws, is likely to result in a divergence among the circuits and an 
eventual Supreme Court ruling.   
  The purpose of this section is to predict how the current Supreme Court is 
likely to rule on the constitutionality of state legislation restricting the use of PI 
data for commercial purposes.  To do so, a brief analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
commercial speech jurisprudence is first conducted.  Next, the section argues that a 
seemingly unrelated 2010 Supreme Court case involving federal campaign finance 
laws, Citizens United v. FEC, is likely to have important implications for how the 
current Court is likely to view the regulation of PI data.96   
1.  The Supreme Court’s evolving commercial speech jurisprudence.  
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s seminal ruling in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), commercial speech was 
treated as wholly beyond the protection of the First Amendment.  For example, in 
Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Court held that handbills 
advertising submarine tours on one side, and listing grievances with local 
government on the other, were entitled to no First Amendment protection.  
Following Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech received an intermediate level of 
First Amendment protection.  The case did not resolve the issue permanently, 
however, as many believe that no other area of First Amendment jurisprudence has 
proved so divisive.97  
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  In resolving a question regarding the constitutionality of a restriction on 
commercial speech, one must first determine whether the speech at issue is 
properly categorized as “commercial speech.”   The Supreme Court first elaborated 
on the standard for this determination in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), 
stating that “[t]he diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make 
speech ‘commercial’ in widely varying degrees.”98  And the following year, in 
Virginia Pharmacy, the court defined commercial speech as speech that “does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.”99  Yet, only three years later, in 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Court was confronted 
with the question of whether informational pamphlets accompanying contraceptives 
were commercial speech.  The Court held that the combined factors of (i) the 
promotional nature of the pamphlets, (ii) reference to specific products, and (iii) the 
manufacturer’s economic motivation for sending the pamphlets, rendered them 
commercial speech.100  The relative importance of each of these factors is unclear, 
and the modern standard is often rephrased as inquiring as to whether the 
communication is “strictly business.”101 
  Once speech is categorized as commercial, the current standard the Supreme 
Court utilizes for analyzing restrictions on commercial speech is the intermediate-
scrutiny test elaborated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 and explained above.  But, the Supreme Court has 
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applied the Central Hudson test inconsistently, and the current trend appears to be 
in favor of increased scrutiny—some argue strict scrutiny—of restrictions on 
commercial speech.102   
  This increased scrutiny has taken the form of (i) requiring more convincing 
evidence that the government’s substantial interest is advanced by the restrictions 
on speech, and (ii) a more thorough analysis of less restrictive alternatives.103  For 
example, in 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, a unanimous Court overturned 
Rhode Island laws banning liquor price advertisements prior to the point of sale, 
finding that despite the reasonable assumption that prohibiting price advertising 
will result in less open competition, leading to higher prices and hence lower 
demand, “the State has presented no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition 
will significantly reduce marketwide consumption.”104  More recently, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center represents a strict 
application of the Central Hudson requirement that restrictions on speech be no 
more extensive than necessary.105    
2.  The impact of Citizens United v. FEC.  
 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, invalidating the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s prohibition of 
corporate independent expenditures, has important implications for the Supreme 
                                                 
102 Post supra note 98.  See also Tamara R. Piety, Commentary, Citizens United and the Threat 
to the Regulatory State, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 16 (2010).    
103 See Adam Larson, Commercial Speech & Prescription Drug Promotion: Where have we been & 
where are we going, Food and Drug Law: An Electronic Book of Student Papers (2005), available at  
http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/704/Larson05.html#fnB251.  
104 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (emphasis in original). 
105 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (stating that “if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that 
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”).   27 
 
Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence, and important implications for the anti-
distortion rationale utilized by the First Circuit in upholding restrictions on the use 
of PI data for commercial purposes.106     
a.  Citizens United further develops the Supreme Court’s trend towards increased 
scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech. 
 
Citizens United conflicts in two important ways with the treatment of commercial 
speech as less valued speech subject to intermediate, as opposed to strict, scrutiny.  
First, in Citizens United the Court repeatedly identified corporations as “citizens,” 
emphasizing the unconstitutionality of focusing on the identity of a speaker.107  
Second, if one cannot distinguish between corporate and non-corporate “citizens” in 
regulating speech, then the argument can be made that because commercial speech 
is central to the existence of a corporate “citizen,” then the same standard of review 
should apply to state regulation of commercial speech as to an individual’s 
speech.108  To do otherwise would be to unavoidably discriminate based on the 
identity of the speaker.  Indeed, some have argued that Citizens United “suggests 
that with the proper case, there is an increased likelihood the Supreme Court will 
either do away with the commercial speech doctrine . . . or retain the doctrine but 
apply strict scrutiny review.109       
b.  Citizens United reflects an unwillingness of the Court to accept the distortion or 
corruption rational which underlies the restrictions on the use of PI data for 
commercial purposes. 
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While the implications of Citizens United on the commercial speech doctrine are 
important, the Supreme Court need not abolish or modify its existing commercial 
speech doctrine in order to strike down restrictions on the commercial use of PI 
data.  In fact, increased scrutiny by the Court is likely to come within the existing 
Cental Hudson framework by (i) requiring a stronger showing that the restrictions 
on commercial speech directly advance the substantial interest of the states, and (ii) 
conducting a closer examination of the potential alternative methods of advancing 
that interest.  As explained above, essential to the arguments in favor of restricting 
the commercial use of PI data is the contention that the data “tip[s] the balance of 
bargaining power” in favor of sales representatives, allowing them to “manipulate” 
or “compromise[] the integrity of physician decisionmaking.”110  This same 
rationale, albeit in a different context, was emphatically rejected by the Court in 
Citizens United. 
  Central to the Court’s ruling in Citizens United was a discussion of the long-
recognized compelling government interest in preventing “corruption or the 
appearance of corruption” in the electoral context.111   Prior to the ruling, the 
Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the compelling governmental interest of 
preventing “corruption or the appearance of corruption” justified a broad range of 
limitations on the election-related activities of individuals, corporations, labor 
unions, political parties, and political action committees.112  The Court also defined 
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this interest broadly, encompassing “the avoidance of the appearance of improper 
influence,”113 and, in 2003 in McConnell v. FEC,114 further explained that the court 
had “firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond [quid-pro-
quo] corruption to curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the 
appearance of such influence.’”115   
  Citizens United represents a significant narrowing of this anti-corruption 
rationale.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion stated plainly that “we now conclude 
that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give 
rise to corruption of the appearance of corruption.”116  Justice Kennedy continued, 
asserting that “[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected 
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”117  The narrowing of the 
anti-corruption interest in the political speech context has important implications 
for state restrictions on the use of PI data.  In Citizens United, the Court clarified 
that it is unlikely to view such a rationale favorably, and unlikely to defer to 
legislative judgments regarding such undue influence or favoritism. 118   
  Admittedly, Citizens United is a political, rather than commercial, speech 
case.  Nonetheless, the underlying rationale is similar—preventing the distortion of 
judgment alleged to result from undue influence.  The Supreme Court is even more 
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likely to view this rationale skeptically when the information being provided is 
truthful.  Courts have consistently overturned restrictions on commercial speech 
when those restrictions are motivated by “a fear that people would make bad 
decisions if given truthful information.”119  As one expert observed, this Court 
opposition to “paternalism” means that “[s]tate efforts to advance legitimate 
interests through the suppression of accurate information [are likely to] arouse[] the 
suspicion of an increasing number of justices.”120   
  Restrictions on the commercial use of PI data are a prime target for such 
suspicion from the Court as they represent (i) an attempt to limit, or at least to 
make less effective, the transfer of truthful information to physicians, and (ii) are 
motivated by a concern that such information and the relationships cultivated 
through the transfer of such information result in undue influence on physicians 
judgment.  Thus, the Court is likely to agree with the New Hampshire district 
court, when it reasoned that “[h]ealth care providers are highly trained 
professionals who . . . are more able than the general public to evaluate truthful 
pharmaceutical marketing messages” and concluded that “the State simply does not 
have a substantial interest in shielding them from sales techniques that enhance 
the effectiveness of truthful and non-misleading marketing information.”121 
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 VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
It is likely only a matter of time before the Supreme Court considers the 
constitutionality of restricting the use of PI data for commercial purposes.  
Necessary to the rationale supporting restrictions on the commercial use of PI data 
is the claim that it facilitates the manipulation, and hence, corruption, of 
physicians’ decision-making process with regard to prescribing medication.  After 
Citizens United, however, the Supreme Court is likely to subject restrictions on 
commercial speech to increased scrutiny, and is unlikely to view such the anti-
corruption rationale favorably.  Thus, the Supreme Court is likely to rule that 
restrictions on the use of PI data for commercial purpose are unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment. 
 